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Note
THE ATTORNEY AS PLAINTIFF: TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
WITH CONTRACT AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP
I.

INThODUCrION

An attorney's right to compensation is protected by lien laws, some-

times criticized as inadequate,' which vary substantially from state to
state.2 For most of an attorney's practice, his own jurisdiction's lien
statutes may be satisfactory. Yet in a particularly valuable case, he
may suddenly discover their limitations. He may, for instance, discover that his lien has not properly attached because of failure to
comply with statutory requirements. 3 He may discover that he has
inadvertently "waived" his lien.4 He may discover that the agreement
he had with his client is scrutinized for anything vaguely resembling
an impropriety, 5 and if his contract is ineffective, his lien may likewise fail. 6 There are even states where a lawyer has no lien on a cause
of action which is non-survivable, as with personal torts.7 The lawyer
may also discover that his client's unilateral settlement precludes a
lien and relegates him to a separate action against his client for
compensation. 8 And if the client should be persuaded to drop the
suit altogether, the lawyer may discover that there is nothing to which
a lien can attach.9
Therefore the lien laws do not guarantee security or recompense
for one's efforts. But if a lawyer's lien proves to be of no avail, his principal alternative is an undesirable suit against his former client. The
reluctance to proceed against one's former client to collect a fee is traditional and well advised. 10 Moreover, the "fee" may be limited to resI Wentworth, Attorney's Liens: A Survey and a Proposal, 35 CoNN. B.J. 191,
199-200 (1961); Stevens, Our Inadequate Attorney's Lien Statutes: A Suggestion,
31 WAsH.
L. REv. 1 (1956).
2
Wentworth, supra note 1, at 191; Stevens, note 1 supra.
3 7 Am. Jum. 2d Attorney and Client § 287 (1963).
4 Wentworth, supra note 1, at 198; 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorney and Client § 292
(1963).
5 Wentworth, supra note 1, at 203; Stevens, supra note 1, at 15.
6 Wentworth, supra note 1, at 196.
7 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorney and Client § 297 (1963).
8 Lyman v. Campbell, 182 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
9 MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FFES FOR LEGAL SEavicEs 76 (1964).

by "Attorneys are generally reluctant to enforce their right to compensation
by suit because of fear that the adverse publicity of such an action will outweigh
any gain that might be forthcoming." Wentworth, supra note 1, at 204. See also,
Canon 14, A.B.A. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHscs.
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titution for services actually rendered, even though the cause of action
may have been for damages in the tens of thousands of dollars. And
where the client has acted of his own free will, standard doctrine
grants him an absolute right to dispense with his attorney.
In some cases, an alternative to the sullied image which would result from hounding a former client does exist. There is the possibility
of suit against a person who has induced (or coerced) a settlement
through superior economic or psychological leverage. Malicious interference with contract or with prospective economic advantage," a
relative newcomer to the law of torts, has recently been extended to
the attorney-client relationship. This development has begun to fill a
gap in the protection afforded an attorney's interest. In a proper case,
the attorney could entirely dispense with lien theories and proceed
against an intermeddler, such as an insurance company, who was not
a party to the prior litigation and who might not be reachable under
the lien laws. 1 2 It is also possible that lien statutes would inadequately
protect an attorney from someone who had moved with great dispatch
to settle and to eliminate the attorney from further proceedings. 13
This would injure not only the attorney, but also the client, who might
be induced to settle for far less than he might obtain with aid of
counsel. Therefore, despite earlier hesitancy, the courts are gradually
moving toward acceptance of an attorney's clear and vested right of
action against persons who disrupt perfectly legitimate relationships
with a client.
II. INTERFERENCE WrrH EcoNoMIc INMIEST AS A

ToRT

The standard opening gambit in any discussion of intentional inducement of breach of contract or other interference with economic
advantages is a comment on its relatively recent appearance in legal
11Although sometimes treated as if they were distinct torts, interference
with contract and interference with prospective economic advantage tend to
coalesce. Certainly as Prosser points out, the kinds of interests protected differ
only in degree and their development has been along singularly parallel lines.
PRossER, TomTs § 124, at 974-76 (3d ed. 1964). For our purposes, therefore, the
terms are nearly interchangeable.
12 Stevens, supra note 1, at 15. It should be pointed out that many lien
statutes, such as Ky. REv. STAT. § 80.200 (1942) [hereinafter cited as KRS],
provide for the lien to attach not only to the client's interests, but also render
the defendant in the original cause of action liable under the lien in case of
settlement. But see text at note 13 infra.
13 Stevens, supra note 1, at 14. The equities in such a situation would be
particularly balanced in favor of the attorney if, during a short delay motivated
by an ethical desire to investigate the facts before filing a complaint, the defendant
or his insurer, in a position to already know the facts, rushed a settlement with
the client.
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conceptualism. 14 Because of divergencies among various jurisdictions
and differences of opinion among judges themselves, a standardized
definition is difficult. Nevertheless, a working statement can be derived
as follows:
Unless operating within a judicially cognizable privilege, one who
induces or in some other manner intentionally causes a party not to per-

form a contract or not to maintain a business relation with the plaintiff is
liable for the resultant harm. 15

If the gist of plaintiff's action is interference with a contract, rather
than merely prospective advantage, any enforceable (and some un-

enforceable) contract should be sufficient. The essential elements are:
(1) a valid contractual relationship or economic expectancy; (2)
knowledge of the relationship on the part of the defendant; (3) actual
causation of a breach by defendant; (4) intent to interfere; and (5)
damage to the complaining party. 6 Malevolence may be weighed
against the defendant, or, on the other hand, ignored by the court

as not a legal wrong it itself. 1 7 However, reprehensible motivations
5
will always bear upon questions of privilege.'
As one commentator has remarked, there has been an "increasingly
wide judicial recognition of tort liability for inducing breach of con-

tract."19 This general trend has doubtless influenced the attitude of the
bench toward the attorney's cause of action, in appropriate situations.
III. GRowING

APPLiCABrYo
o T

ATroRNEY-CLmNT RELATIONSHnP

Of some thirty reported cases clearly dealing with litigation between a plaintiff-attorney and a defendant who interfered with the
attorney-client relationship, the first is of 1931 vintage.20 The first
thirty years, until 1961, saw many of these cases determined against
the attorney. Frequently it was even held that he had no cause of
action at all against the interferor. The past six years have seen one-

third of the litigation in this area, and only one of the recent cases,
14 E.g., 3 Amz. L. REv. 310 (1961).

The landmark case is of course Lumley

v. Gye, 2 El. & B1. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853).
15 With apologies to RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 766 (1939), from which this
statement was derived. See text at notes 57-59 infra, for other statements of
definitional import.
16 Calbom v. Knudtzon, 396 P.2d 148 (Wash. 1964).
17 PROSSER, TORTS § 123, at 950-52 (3d ed. 1964).
18 RESTATE~mNT, TORTS § 767, comment a (1939).
19 1961 DuKE L.J. 582.
20 Gordon v. Mankoff, 146 Misc. 258, 261 N.Y. Supp. 888 (N.Y. City Ct.
1931). This is also the conclusion of the writer of a student comment, 3 A=u.
L. REv. 310 (1961).
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Walsh v. O'Neill, flatly denied the attorney's cause of action and re-

fused to extend ordinary interference-with-economic-advantage princi-

ples to the attorney-client relationship. 21 Admittedly this statistical

sample is too small for sweeping deductions, but increasing use by
lawyers of a tort action against third-party interferors is clear enough.
In a proper case, an attorney whose efforts have been short-circuited to
his economic detriment has a strong line of well-reasoned authorities
favoring him.
This more favorable stance of courts has been accorded treatment
in the casual manner reserved for established principles in a treatise on

contingent fees.
The interest of a discharged lawyer in a contingent fee contract has
been protected by some courts against interference by third parties. For
example, a California court recently gave an attorney a right of action
against an insurance company which persuaded the client to discharge
his attorney and settle the case without his participation. The court held
that, although the client could discharge his lawyer and settle at any time,
a third party could not persuade him to do so without some valid reason
for the intervention. While some courts have not extended this protection to contingent fee contracts, all would prohibit fraudulent or
illegal interference. 22 (Footnotes omitted.)

Liberalizing forces which have made the attorney's cause of action
against intermeddlers increasingly feasible as a remedy fall into three

basic categories. In the first category, competing policies have been
balanced and considered in various cases, until the interests favoring
a posture of toleration for the attorney's cause of action have gained
recognition. In the second, procedural and substantive law have undergone modification. In the third, there has been more liberality in matters of proof, in the sense that less weight is being demanded of the
attorney's evidence. In earlier cases, a lawyer-plaintiff seemed required
to present almost overwhelming proof of his allegations. Nagging

little discrepancies in the defendant's proof, to which contemporary
courts might prove more alert, were frequently ignored. 23
21215 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. 1966). The interferor-defendant here was another
attorney whose advice contributed to or caused the dismissal of plaintiffs. The
court (at p. 918) noted that no breach of contract was alleged and (at pp. 917-18)
that Massachusetts precedent refused to extend the tort of interference with an
existing
business relationship to the attorney-client situation.
22
MAcKInNoN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 76.
23 Barnes v. Quigley, 49 A.2d 467, 468 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1946) (defendant claimed lack of knowledge of plaintiff's contract). See text at note 91
infra. See also Dombey, Tyler, Richards & Crieser v. Detroit, T. & I.R.R., 851
F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1965) (appellate court willing to find lack of defendant's
knowledge of contingent fee nature of contract, although trial court had found
such knowledge implicit and despite strong "concurring" opinion which was
equivalent to a dissent).

[Vol. 55,
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IV. COMPEIG POUcIEs AND GRowING LmiATixry IN ALLOWING AN
ATromn-EY To SuE INTmDDLERs

One authority has noted with approval the tendency of courts to
lay aside earlier dependence on formulas and to explicitly analyze the
interests of the parties involved in an interference-with-economic-interest situation.2 4 In an attorney-client context, what are these interests?
While the following are not guaranteed to exhaust all possibilities, the
more obvious fall under six categories of competing policies. These
policies, which are in constant competition with each other, seem
presently to strike a nearly equal balance between attorney-plaintiffs
and defendant-interferors. As a result, many cases of this nature may
hinge upon particular factual circumstances.
These competing policy considerations are as follows: (1) the lawyer's (presumed) capability of fending for himself and protecting his
own interest; (2) the client's nearly absolute right to terminate the
relationship with his attorney and its "logical" correlative-the impossibility of inducing a "breach" of such a relationship; (3) a policy
strongly favoring settlements, but balanced against a policy, just as
strong, against fraudulent or collusive settlements; (4) a policy slightly
disfavoring contingent fee contracts; (5) a policy of disfavoring the
novel, unfamiliar cause of action and of resorting to treatises which are
sometimes out of date or inappropriate for a developing tort; and (6)
a policy of protecting a client from his own attempts to dispense with
necessary legal advice at the instance of another, who may well be
interested in seeing the client unprotected.
1. The Risks of the Profession. Implicit in many of the decisions
regarding the attorney-plaintiff's cause of action against a third party
interferor is the feeling that an attorney, by virtue of his calling, must
assume risks, one of which is the loss of dissatisfied clients, and another of which is strenuous competition in and out of court. A minimum of protection is customarily afforded the lawyer by the bench.
The prevalent attitude seems to be that he is in a superior position
for self-protection because of his legal knowledge, his capabilities, and
his experience.2 5 Quite possibly an attorney would not be allowed to
24

25

PRossma, Toars § 123, at 952 (3d ed. 1964).

Marson v. Cuthbertson, 250 N.Y.S.2d 595, 597 (Civ. Ct. of City of
N.Y. 1964):
Regardless of the vicissitudes of litigation, it is the plaintiff's chosen
profession and if he is engaged in a hard-fought and exhausting legal
battle, it is immaterial how exasperating or aggravating it may be.

Situations, as they occur, must be accepted with fortitude and equanimity. Certain it is that an adversary attorney cannot seek damages

(Continued on next page)
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maintain an action against third parties in interference cases unless
such interference could not reasonably or legitimately have been
guarded against by preventive as well as remedial measures. 26
2 The Client's Right to Terminate. Beyond cavil, an attorney's
grasp upon his client is limited by exceptionally strong legal and social policies. Because of the "peculiar nature and character of the
[attorney-client] relationship, which in its very essence is one of trust
and confidence ....a client has the right to [dismiss his attorney] ...
with or without cause." 27 The right to terminate an unsatisfactory
relationship at the will of the client is nearly absolute, and the
question is therefore asked by some courts (and defendants), "How
can a 'breach' of a contract at the will of one of the parties be said to
have been 'induced' so that an action in tort for interference will lie?"
This sort of "logic" seems to have been blindly accepted by some
courts.28 The analogous right to settle without the consent or participation of the attorney, as distinguished from the right to terminate entirely, has been explicitly remarked upon in just such simplistic,
deceptively logical terms.
The settlement made by the plaintiffs' client was within her contract
rights. She committed no breach of her contract with the plaintiffs by
maling the settlement. It follows that the defendant who29induced her
to make it committed no legal wrong against the plaintiffs.

Thus, particularly in the earlier cases, intermeddlers might well be
able to hide safely behind the skirts of the plaintiff's former client.
However, the stronger and more reasonable view seems to be
prevailing. Concerning contracts terminable at the will of the promisor,
a leading authority has pointed out that "the overwhelming majority
of the cases have held that interference with employments or other
contracts terminable at will is actionable, since until it is terminated
the contract is a subsisting relation, of value to the plaintiff, and pre(Footnote continued from preceding page)

against the adverse litigant for strenuously or aggravatingly opposing
any such attorney.
Appearing as this does in a recent case involving a suit against third parties
allegedly interfering with the attorney's contract with his client, such a statement
significantly underlines the continuing policy of demanding a maximum of selfreliance from attorneys.
26 See Orr v. Mutual Benefit Health & Ace. Ass'n, 240 Mo. App. 236,
207 S.W.2d 511 (1947).
207 ordon v.Mankoff, 146 Misc. 258, 261 N.Y. Supp. 888, 889 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1931).
28
Walsh v. O'Neill, 215 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Mass. 1966); Herbits v. Constitution Indem. Co., 279 Mass. 539, 181 N.E. 723 (1932); Orr v. Mutual Benefit
Health & Acc. Ass'n, 240 Mo. App. 236, 207 S.W.2d 511 (1947).
29Herbits v. Constitution Indem. Co., 278 Mass. 539, 181 N.E. 723, 725

(1932).
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sumably to continue in effect."30 Of itself, terminability at will is
usually not a defense or justification for interference.3 1 Furthermore, a

leading case in this area of interference with attorney-client contracts
relied at least in part upon the principle that a contract "'not only binds
the parties to it. . . , but also imposes on all the world the duty of
respecting that contractual obligation.!" 2 Using this as the springboard of reasoning, even the most conservative court would be forced
to admit the logic of making interference with arrangements terminable

at the client's will actionable.
8. The Favored Right to Settle. Related closely to the client's
privilege to terminate is the policy favoring settlements of claims, in
good faith, and the avoidance of litigation. As with the right to terminate, the right to settle has sometimes proved determinative in actions instituted by a plaintiff-attorney against an interferor. 33 However,
the privilege to settle one's own cause of action without the participation, or even against the advice of, one's attorney is limited to settlements made in good faith. The policy against fraudulent or collusive
settlements is just as strong as, if not stronger than, the policy favoring
settlements. 34 As a matter of practical tactics, a plaintiff-attorney would
do well to emulate the lawyer who conceded the client's right to
settle but complained, "because the client, falsely denying the
existence of a contract, repudiated it and assumed that position by
reason of the wrongful instigation of these defendants." 35

In balancing competing interests, it should be carefully noted that
permitting third parties to induce a breach of attorney-client contracts
30

§ 123, at 957 (3d ed. 1964).
Studdard v. Evans, 108 Ga. App. 819, 135 S.E.2d 60 (1964); Gordon
v. Mankoff, 146 Misc. 258, 261 N.Y. Supp. 888, 889 (1931); 3 Aiz. L. REv. 310,
311 (1961). But see, Hansen v. Barrett, 183 F. Supp. 831, 833 (D. Minn. 1960)
(dictum).
32
Klauder v. Cregar, 327 Pa. 1, 192 Aft. 667, 668 (1937).
33
See text at note 28 supra; Krause v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 331 Mvfich.
19, 49 N.W.2d 41, 44-45 (1951); Orr v. Mutual Benefit Health & Ace. Assn,
240 Mo. App. 236, 207 S.W.2d 511, 515 (1947).
If the attorney obtains an agreement not to settle or an agreement otherwise
binding the client to what may become an unconscionable arrangement (such
as a vaguely worded agreement to retain the plaintiff for the client's lifetime and
purporting to bind the executor of the estate, Hansen v. Barrett, 183 F. Supp.
831, 833 (D. Minn. 1960)), the right to settle overrides since such agreements
are ordinarily void as against public policy. MAcKINNON, op. cit. supra note
9, at 75.
34 See, e.g., Bauer v. Biel, 177 N.E.2d 269, 273 (Ind. App. 1961), where it
was said, "dishonest settlements made to cheat attorneys out of their fees will
PRossER, TORTS

31

be brushed
aside.
35

. ."

Lurie v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 270 N.Y. 379, 1 N.E.2d 472, 473
(1936). Unfortunately, under New York law, the plaintiff was relegated to only
quantum neruit damages.
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would not really result in more or better settlement of claims.36
Obviously, more litigation may arise -when the attorney seeks compensation. Moreover, an induced settlement may prove unsatisfactory or
inadequate, and breed further claims against the original defendant
by the settlor.
4. Contingent Fee Arrangements. Other policy considerations arise
when a defendant in an interference case attempts to attack the
propriety or validity of a contingent fee contract. It should of course
come as no surprise that most of the fact patterns in which interference
with the attorney-client relationship is claimed involve contingent fees
and personal injury actions. The struggle for respectability of the
contingent fee arrangement, the abuses to which it is subject, and its
less than enthusiastic acceptance by more idealistic jurists to this very
day, is common knowledge. Very little documented support could be
mustered for a thesis that the reluctance to accept contingent fee contracts was at least one factor in earlier decisions bearing unfavorably
upon the attorney's right to proceed against third parties. 37 But the
fact remains that much of the resistance to contingent fee contracts was
contemporaneous with the earlier negative attitude of some courts
toward suits against intermeddlers. 38 Moreover, it was not until general
acceptance, or tolerance, of contingent fee contracts was established
that suits for interference with such contracts were attempted.39 Defendants still collaterally attack contingent fee contracts, sometimes
with a modicum of success. 40 Yet direct attacks upon the contingent
nature of a breached contract as champertous or contrary to public
policy, made albeit a trifle desperately in some cases, have also been
made. Generally the courts have treated them in deservedly summary
361961 DuxE L.J. 582, 585-86.
37 See Richette v. Solomon, 410 Pa. 6, 187 A.2d 910 (1963) where the
propriety of contingent fee arrangements vis-a-vis the attorney's right of action
against
38 interference was clearly recognized.
Denial of the lawyer's cause of action, in toto, was the most frequent
during the 1930's, and, as previously indicated, no such suits were even brought
prior to 1930. See note 39 infra.
39 The first case allowing the cause of action was in 1931. See note 20 supra.
Canon 13, A.B.A. CANONs OF PnomssioNAL ETmcs, recognizing the propriety
of contingent fee arrangements, was amended in 1933 to read: "A contract for a
contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case.., but should always be subject to the supervision of
a court,
4 0 as to its reasonableness." Dnnimax, LEGAL ETmcs 313 (1953).
Dombey, Tyler, Richards & Grieser v. Detroit, T. & I.R.R., 351 F.2d 121
6th Cir. 1965), reversing 226 F. Supp. 345 (S.D. Ohio 1964), and remanding
or additional findings as to whether plaintiff-attorneys had agreed to advance
client money for living expenses, i.e., "maintenance." The attitude of the majority
in this case indicates a prejudice against contingent fee arrangements, particularly
where the attorneys in the original action were brought into the picture through

the auspices of a labor union.
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fashion. 41 Contingent fee contracts would not appear therefore to be
vulnearble, as a matter of policy, to attack by a defendant seeking to
excuse his own conduct.
5. The Novel Cause of Action, the Unknown. The relative novelty
and resultant confusion surrounding an attorney's cause of action in
tort against intruders has sometimes caused untoward results. A lack
of firm precedent leaves some courts grasping at out-of-date treatises
or poorly reasoned decisions from other jurisdictions which are only
vaguely in point. 42 For a tort which is still developing, such authorities
can be more stifling and detrimental to sound decisions than an in43
adequate but self-reliant analysis of the situation.
On the other hand, some courts which were confronted with a new
situation, particularly where the attorney-plaintiff included strong reminders that he was not proceeding on a lien theory but in tort, have
selected different authorities and reached conclusions more favorable to
the plaintiff.44 At any rate, the resort to treatises and decisions from
other jurisdictions when confronted with a novel cause of action,
though necessary, entails the danger of consulting mechanical rules
and points of view which are inadequate to deal with new conditions
and a still-developing tort concept.
6. The Client'sNeed for Legal Advice. One more policy consideration has recently been articulated. The law not only favors good faith
settlements and scrutinizes the peculiarly fiduciary and terminable
nature of attorney-client agreements, but it has also come to recognize
that the interests of persons involved in legal disputes are best served
by having competent legal advisors. Obviously, an advantageous tactic
available to one's adversaries at law would be to persuade him to
dispense with the services of counsel.45
41
Dombey, Tyler, Richards & Grieser v. Detroit, T. & I.R.R., 226 F. Supp.
345, 348 (S.D. Ohio 1964), redd, 351 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1965); State Farm Fire
Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 184 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1950); Richette v. Solomon,410 Pa.
6, 187
42 A.2d 910 (1963).
Krause v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 331 Mich. 19, 49 N.W.2d 41,
44 (1951) (citing cases from other states and CooLEY, ToRTS (1936).
43For instance, an ordinarily competent state court, relying on weak, out
of date authorities, can be led to make an overly broad denial of the entire cause
of action. Krause v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 331 Mich. 19, 49 N.W.2d

41 (1951).
44

Herron v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 14 Cal. Rep. 294, 296, 363 P.2d
310, 312 (1961) (citing RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 767, and PRossER, Tonrs 735
et seq. (2d ed. 1955)); Keels v. Powell, 207 S.C. 97, 34 S.E.2d 482 (1945) (citing
62 CJ.
4 5 1141).
This was explicitly recognized by one of the most recent landmark cases
in this area, where the client's potential liability to the discharged lawyer was also
(Continued on next page)
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One commentator emphasizes the detrimental "effect upon the administration of justice as a whole" were courts to allow easy interference with the attorney-client relationship at the instigation of interlopers.40 In doing so, noteworthy quotation is made from an article of
limited availability.
From time immemorial, the relationship between attorney and client
has enjoyed a peculiar and protected status in the law. It is rightly
regarded as a unique and confidential relationship. It necessarily implies
a special trust and confidence among its participants, and the law looks
with jealous concern upon the protection of the relation and deplores incidents between attorney and client which lead to suit. To open the door
to outside parties wantonly to come in and negotiate the destruction of
the relationship would 47
bode no good for either the practitioner, client, or
the public as a whole.
...

V. LBERALIZATION OF PROCEDURAL AND SUBsTANTivE LAW IN ALLOWING
AND DEFINING CAUSE OF AcrION FOR INTERFERENCE: THE ERosIoN OF

DEFENsES

Whether evolution of more liberal policies caused a modification of
the procedural and substantive law in this area, or the two developments were independent, or perhaps interdependent, there remains a
pronounced drift away from earlier requirements which had placed
onerous burdens upon an attorney seeking to recover from one who
had intentionally disrupted his association with a client.
1. Procedure. The lawyer has incidentally benefited from procedural policies which were developed without regard to his cause of
action in tort. The liberalizing trend symbolized and carried forward
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and adopted substantially by
more and more states, places emphasis upon reaching the merits of a
dispute and preventing valid claims or defenses from being lost in a
quagmire of technicalities. 48 Thus one may contrast the earlier tendency to declare that allegations of interference with the attorneyclient relationship do not state a "cause of action" with allowing proceedings to determine whether there is a claim upon which relief can
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

pointed out. Herron v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 14 Cal. Rep. 294, 296,

363 P.2d 310, 313 (1961):

The conduct of the insurance company in inducing an injured person
to repudiate his contract with an attorney may be detrimental not only to
the interests of the attorney, but also to the interest of the client, since,
as we have seen, the client, in addition to being deprived of the aid
and advice of his attorney, may also be liable for the full contract fee.
46 1961 DuKE L.J. 582 n.24.
47 Ibid. Quoting Blackwell, Interference with Contract for Attorney's Fees
as a Cause
of Action, 9 UNv. OF S.C. SnL.m. Socy Y:Ea BooK 31, 35 (1948).
48
WmuGnr, FEaa
CourTs § 68 (1963).
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be granted. 49 The salutary effect of liberalized rules of procedure is
most pronounced in the federal courts, where many of the recent interference cases have been brought.50 The most extreme federal case to
date presents an example of a court's literally bending over backwards
to allow litigation under allegations which would have been fatally
flawed under virtually all earlier decisions. In Hansen v. Barrett,1 it
was held that an action would lie for interference with the lawyerclient relationship despite: (1) ambiguities in the agreement upon
which the action was predicated; (2) its terminability at the will
of the client; and (3) the fact that if strictly construed as alleging only
a wrongful inducement of breach of contract, the court would have
been disinclined to find a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The complaint withstood defendant's motion for summary judgment
because a liberal construction permitted the allegation of the tort of
52
wrongful interference with prospective economic advantage.
2. Substantive Law. In addition to procedural policies favoring arrival at the merits of a case, trial of issues, and liberal implementation
of the rules, the various aspects of the substantive law governing this
area of tort law have likewise undergone gradual modification. There
still remains no single, simple, or definitive statement of the elements
of tortious interference,5 3 and courts have tended to play loosely with
existing definitional language. Thus a 1932 case 54 could speak of the
necessity for "either actual ill will or purpose to harm (the finding of
which is not here warranted) or the lack of legal justification"5
(Emphasis added.), and then proceed to give less than meticulous attention to defendant's "justification." And a commentator concluded,
perhaps erroneously, that in almost all states, as of 1961, an attorney
49
Compare Krause v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 831 Mich, 19, 49 N.W.2d
41 (1951)
with Hansen v. Barrett, 183 F. Supp. 831 (D. Minn. 1960).
5
OEmployer's Liability Assur. Corp. v. Freeman, 229 F.2d 547 (10th Cir.
1955); State Farm Fire Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 184 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1950);
Greenberg v. Panama Transp. Co., 185 F. Supp. 320 (D. Mass. 1960); Hansen
v. Barrett, 183 F. Supp. 831 (D. Minn. 1960).
51 183 F. Supp. 831, 833 (D. Minn. 1960).
52See generally, PRossER, TonTs § 124 (3d ed. 1964). A less radical, but

additional example of the liberality of federal courts is found in Greenberg v.
Panama Transp. Co., 185 F. Supp. 320 (D. Mass. 1960). Conflict of laws problemis
and the matter of state substantive tort law in diversity actions were not allowed to
stand in the way of results. The court, striking a note of patriotism and liberality,
upheld an attorney's recovery against defendant company, which had cast
aspersions upon "American" attorneys and their role in representing foreign
nationals in injury litigation. As a proctor in admiralty functioning in a personal
injury suit under federal statute (46 U.S.C. § 688), the nonstate character of the
attorney's cause of action was emphasized, since he had been functioning when
wronged
as an officer of a federal court.
53
PROSSER, TORTS § 123 (3d ed. 1964).
5
4 Herbits v. Constitution Indem. Co., 279 Mass, 539, 181 N.E. 723 (1932).
55 Id..

181 N.E. at 724.
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on a contingent fee contract had no protection from a third party who
induced a client, without the knowledge or consent of his attorney, to
settle, even if the third party's motives were "impeachable." 5
Some statements of definitional import, garnered from attorneyclient interference cases, are as follows:
a). If one maliciously interferes in a contract between two parties and
induces one of them to break that contract to the injury of the other, the
party injured can maintain an action against the wrongdoer.57
b). An action will lie for the intentional interference by a third person
with a contractual relationship either by unlawful means or by
means
58
otherwise lawful when there is a lack of sufcient justification.
c). There are four elements of this tort. 1) valid contract relationship
or business expectancy; 2) knowledge of the relationship by interferor; 3)
intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of
the relationship; 4) damage to the party complaining. l will, spite, defamation, fraud, force, coercion.., are not essential ingredients, although
these elements may be shown for such bearing as they may have upon
the defense of privilege.59

To further confuse the situation, the term "malicious" is frequently
prefixed to "interference with contract or business expectancy," but
has been defined variously. Usually it is equated with merely "the
intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal or social justification."60 Indeed, a leading authority has expressed serious doubt concerning the utility or desirability of using the term "malice" at all
when discussing interference. 61
The growing tendency for courts to balance competing interests
in an interference-with-economic-relationship situation has already
been noted.62 Instead of using catchwords and formulas purporting to
define the "cause of action" and to definitely express the substantive
law, the courts more frankly consider the interests at stake. Even those
recent cases which have denied the attorney's cause of action in toto, 63
or rendered an unfavorable decision,6 4 have pointed out the policy
considerations which swayed the court.
As a result, the modification of substantive law in this area has not
been in the realm of more sophisticated or refined statements, but in
G647 VA. L. REv. 706, 708 (1961).

57 Employer's Liability Assur. Corp. v. Freeman, 229 F. 2d 547, 549 (10th
Cir. 1955); Klauder v. Cregar, 327 Pa. 1, 192 At. 667, 668 (1937); Keels v.
Powell, 207 S.C. 97, 34 S.E.2d 482 (1945).
58 Herron v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 14 Cal. Rep. 294, 296, 363 P.2d 310,
312 (1961).
59 Calbom v. Knudtzon, 396 P.2d 148 (Wash. 1964).
60 Klauder v. Cregar, 327 Pa. 1, 192 At. 667, 670; see also Employer's
Liability Assur. Corp. v. Freeman, 229 F.2d 547, 549 (10th Cir. 1955).
01 PRossER, ToRTs § 123, at 951 (3d ed. 1964).
62
See text at note 24 supra.
03 Walsh v. O'Neill, 215 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. 1966).
64Dombey, Tyler, Richards & Grieser v. Detroit, T. & LR.R., 351 F.2d
121 (6th Cir. 1965).
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the recognition of a need for analysis of policies within a rather broad,
even vague, definitional framework-a situation not unknown to tort
law. Therefore, with two exceptions, a plaintiff-attorney would seem
to be on fairly substantial ground in bringing an action where there
has been intentional interference with a known, valid agreement and
such interference is without legal justification. The first exception is
that some courts demand that the interference result in actual breach
of the attorney-client contract and outright, explicit refusal of the exclient to pay the attorney. 65 In these courts, mere damage to the attorney as a result of interference is not sufficient, and it seems that the
tort action against an intruder is regarded as something of a last
resort. The second exception is that a few courts demand that the
manner of interference itself be tortious, i.e., fraudulent or coercive.68
67
Kentucky seems to be one of these.
Although good faith on the part of a defendant will go far toward
protecting him, he has been accorded progressively less shelter from
complaints sounding in the tort of malicious interference. The effectiveness of asserting defensively, as was customary in earlier cases,
that a malicious motive does not of itself constitute a tort6s seems to
have fallen more or less into disuse.6 9 And any arguments based on
the proposition that the general tort rules regarding interference with
contractual relations do not apply to the unique professional relationship of attorney and client would probably face the "why not?"
position taken by several courts. 70 As stated in Herron v. State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co., "There is no valid reason why this rule should not be
applied to an attorney's contingent fee contract."71 At the very least, as
pointed out by other commentators, "fraudulent or illegal interference" 72 or "unconscionable" inducement 73 would support an action.
Other incidental defenses, such as arguments based on the
"champertous" nature of a contingent fee contract, 74 or the plaintiff's
conflict of interests, 73 would probably be given short shrift unless there
65 Ibid; see also text at note 93 infra; Cameron v. Bareneik, 173 .I App.
23 (cited in Krause v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 49 N.W.2d 41, 43 (Mich.
1951));
66 Herbits v. Constitution Indem. Co., 279 Mass. 539, 181 N.E. 723 (1932).
PROSSER, ToRTs § 123, at 954 n.64 (3d ed. 1964).

67 Ibid.
8

6

Krause v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 49 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Mich. 1951);
Gordon v. Mankoff, 261 N.Y. Supp. 888, 890 (1931).
69 At least no such defenses have been noted in recent opinions.
70
Herron v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 14 Cal. Rep. 294, 363 P.2d 310
(1961);
Keels v. Powell, 207 S.C. 97, 34 S.E.2d 482 (1945).
71
Herron v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 70, 363 P.2d at 312.
72
MAcKINNON, Co NT=GENT FEES FOR LEGAL SE vicEs

79 (1964).

7347 VA. L. REv. 706, 709 (1961).
74 See text at note 41 supra.
75
Calbom v. Knudtzon, 396 P.2d 148, 153 (Wash. 1964).
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were irregularities in the original arrangement between the attorney
and his former client. Nor would a defendant be well-advised to rely
on the novelty of the cause of action in his state, in view of the increase in the number of cases and commentary, most pointing out a
trend favorable to plaintiffs. 76 The increased availability of such
authority undermines the diminishing proportion of decisions which
have denied relief to an attorney.
On the other hand, as noted above, some few jurisdictions still
cling to a rule which is highly beneficial to a defendant intermeddler,
namely that the interference must itself be unlawful in nature, and
not merely unjustified. 77 In such jurisdictions, the plaintiff faces a serious handicap under fact patterns which might elsewhere be actionable.
Yet it would not be entirely quixotic for an attorney who has been
outflanked by an interferor to try carving out an exception to such a
rule. As pointed out by one commentator, and this will bear repeating
later, "the courts have relied more upon a 'rule of reason' than an
ambiguous 'rule of law.' Thus if the third party has acted in a manner
which reasonable men would condemn or reproach, he will be held
78
liable to the injured lawyer."
With regard to the affirmative defense of justification, the courts
have generally been moving away from the former position that almost
any interest of a defendant is equivalent to the "equal or superior right
which comes in conflict with the right of a plaintiff under his contract." 79 A sufficiency of justification has come to be required, as opposed to merely some degree of justification. Thus, in a recent landmark case it was indisputably held that an insurer of the person in the
primary action wherein the plaintiff-attorney had been retained was not
justified in interfering with the contract between the attorney and his
client.80 Nor, as was shown by Greenberg v. Panama Transp. Co.,81
does a pre-existing contract with an injured workman necessarily
furnish a defense of justification for interference. The terms of the
contract asserted as a defense may be examined to see if they
specifically cover the situation, S* and even if they do, they may be
83
declared void as against public policy.
76 See

text at note 42 supra, on "novelty" of the cause of action.
v. Patterson, 234 Ky. 757, 29 S.W.2d 26 (1930). But see Derby
Road Bldg. Co. v. Commonwealth, Dep t of Highways, 317 S.W.2d 891 (Ky.
1958) (dictum at 895); Krause v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 49 N.W.2d 41,
44 (Mich. 1951); PRossxa, ToRTS § 123, at 954 n.64 (3d ed. 1964).
78 47 VA. L. REv. 706, 710 (1961).
79
Herbits v. Constitution Indem. Co., 279 Mass. 539, 181 N.E. 723,
724 (1932).
SO Herron v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 14 Cal. Rep. 296, 363 P.2d 310 (1961).
81 185 F. Supp. 320 (D. Mass. 1960).
82 Id. at 325.
83 ibid.
77Brooks
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In all likelihood, no formula can ever properly describe all possible
claims and types of justification available to a defendant, e.g., preexisting contract, competition, fiduciary or other special relationship.
Once again, it would seem that policy considerations should predominate; perhaps the best statment of an adequate approach is found
in the Herron case.
Whether an intentional interference by a third party is justifiable depends upon a balancing of the importance, social and private, of the objective advanced by the interference against the importance of the interest interfered with, considering all the circumstances, including the
nature of the actor's conduct and the relationship between the parties.8 4

Such a balancing approach, handled adeptly, should prove very fruitful; the case in which it was enunciated, for example, threw two
significant, but theretofore unraised, factors into the balancing process. One was the rules of the National Conference Committee on
Adjusters (which had been violated by defendant insurer when it
dealt directly with the attorney's client). The second was the interest
85
of the client in retaining legal advice.
The related defense of privilege can be remarked upon in much
the same tenor as justification. In fact, it frequently seems that the
terms "justification" and "privilege" are used almost synonymously,
although "privilege" relates more to the defendant's status, while "justification" refers more to his actions. 86 An accountant-tax consultant has
been held not privileged to interfere with his own client's legal counsel,87 and a federal court pronounced itself "not persuaded that the
defendant, who is the sister of the plaintiff's former client, was
privileged as a matter of law to [interfere].. ..,,sThis court seemed
to regard the question of reasonableness as, per the Restatement view,
for the jury.8 9
Likewise, there is authority for the proposition that "good faith"
in making certain remarks is a matter for the jury9 6 where the issue of
what the court termed "excuse" hinged upon the good faith of the
84

Herron v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 14 Cal. Rep. 296, 363 P.2d 310,
312 (1961) (citing inter alia, RESTATEMnT, TORTS § 767; PRossEn, ToRTS 735
et seq. (2d ed. 1955)).
85 Id. at 311, 313.
86 For an example of the confusion, see Greenberg v. Panama Transp. Co.,
185 F. Supp. 320, 325 (D.Mass. 1960), where a prior contract between ex-client
and present defendant was asserted as a "privilege" rather than a "justification"
for interference.
87
Calbom v. Knudtzon, 396 P.2d 148 (Wash. 1964).
88 Hansen v. Barrett, 183 F. Supp. 831, 833 (D. Minn, 1960).
89 Ibid.
9o Employer's Liability Assur. Corp. v. Freeman, 229 F.2d 547 (10th Cir.
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insurer which induced plaintiff's client to discharge him. Evidently the
jury's role in determining the good faith of the intruder as a justification is expanding. The jury, probably more so than the judge, is likely
to regard underhanded maneuvering by the intruder, or his impeachable motives, as a wrong in itself.
VI.

EvENcE

Making allegations which will withstand a defensive pleading that
they do not state a legally recognizable claim, and proving such allegations, are two entirely different problems. The confidential nature of
the attorney-client relationship is such that a heavy burden usually
weighs upon the attorney to prove that he has been bilked out of his
fee. A jaundiced eye would be cast upon an attorney's claim that he
had been dismissed because of the intermeddling of a third party,
rather than because he had proved unsatisfactory to his client. Acquired through generations of relative distrust of lawyers, the natural
tendency exists to require an attorney to produce more than mildly
corroborating circumstances to support his word.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the evidentiary requirements
during the earlier stages of development of the attorney's cause of action were quite stringent.9' In fact, it might be argued that only the
exercise of greater care in amassing proof has caused the recent
success in recovering damages. At any rate, if there has been a
lightening of the evidentiary requirements, it has occurred on an informal level and resulted from a more tolerant attitude toward the
cause of action, rather than from any judicial desire to be more
sympathetic with lawyers as plaintiffs.
Examination of earlier cases shows a distinct tendency to find
against plaintiff-attorneys, despite a fair amount of evidence in their
favor. Thus, although a client maintained he had not employed the
attorney (to whom he had paid a twenty-five dollar retainer), and
the defendant lamely explained the client's testimony that a letter with
plaintiff's letterhead had been on defendant's desk (by saying that
there had been a mail delivery during settlement proceedings), the
trial court found that defendant was unaware of the attorney-client
92
relationship. This finding was upheld on appeal.
91 See Barnes v. Quigley, 49 A.2d 467, 468 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1946).
92 Ibid. Although the conclusion that courts were rigorous in their demands
for proof from complaining attorneys does not automatically flow from the few
available examples, they certainly point in such direction. The earlier reported
cases were for the most part concerned with establishing the attorney's cause
(Continued on next page)
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One item which should give pause to anyone claiming a warming
trend in the evidentiary requirements is the demand still made by
courts that the plaintiff establish that the defendant really induced the
client to sever the relationship. The necessity for proving inducement
is a link in the evidence upon which plaintiff stands or falls.93 Even a
liberal court would still demand evidence of causation, 94 and there is
consistency among all courts in refusing to fall into any post hoc,
propter hoc fallacy of presuming inducement from the fact of termination alone.
Perhaps the best way to test the thesis that there has been
liberalization in evidentiary requirements is to trace one particular
type of evidence which has proved less immune to defendant's rebutting proof as years have passed, namely, letters and statements
obtained by defendant-intruders from the ex-cient. In at least two
early cases, such statements were accepted virtually at face value, and
in one instance, plaintiff's claim that such statement was fraudulently
obtained counted for naught. 95 In later cases, however, defendant's aid
in drafting the letter of dismissal has weighed heavily against him.9
At least one court has pointed to the inconsistency of the language
used in such a letter with the ex-cient's own "limited education" as
evidence against the defendant.97 And in another case, an excellent
concurring opinion, which amounted to a dissent, took the same factor
into consideration. 98 At any rate, such aid in writing letters can be
counted as one element of defendant's conduct rendering him liable.9 9
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

of action, if any, rather than dealing with sufficiency of evidence. Nor can it
be said with absolute confidence that the liberalizing trend in recognizing the
attorney's right to proceed in tort against interferors carries over into lightened
evidentiary requirements. Yet, the fact remains that not only the cause of action
itself, but judgments awarded thereunder, are more generally being upheld
on review.
93 See Klauder v. Cregar, 327 Pa. 1, 192 Atl. 667, 670 (1937), where the
Herbits case was distinguished: "in that case it did not appear that any state-

ments were made which would lead the client to breach her contract to pay
the attorneys." See also Employer's Liability Assur. Corp. v. Freeman, 229 F.2d
547, 549 (10th Cir. 1955); Saul v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 203 A.2d
424 94
(D.C. App. 1964).

Herron v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 14 Cal. Rep. 296, 363 P.2d 310
(1961); see also, Saul v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 203 A.2d 424 (D.C. App.
1964).
95 Orr v. Mutual Benefit Health & Ace. Ass'n, 240 Mo. App. 236, 238, 207

S.W.2d 511, 512 (1947); Barnes v. Quigley, 49 A.2d 467 (D.C. Munic. Ct.App.
1946).
96

Herron v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 14 Cal. Rep. 296, 363 P.2d 310,
311 (1961); Studdard v. Evans, 108 Ga. App. 819, 135 S.E.2d 60, 64 (1964);

Richette
v. Solomon, 410 Pa. 6, 187 A.2d 910, 914 (1963).
97
Richette v. Solomon, supra note 96, 187 A.2d at 914.
98

Dombey, Tyler, Richards & Grieser v. Detroit, T. & I.R.P., 351 F.2d 121,

135 (6th
Cir. 1965).
99

Dombey, Tyler, Richards & Grieser v. Detroit, T. & I.R.R., 226 F. Supp.

345, 348 (S.D. Ohio 1964), rev'd, 351 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1965).
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As a practical matter, evidentiary requirements have proved to
be best satisfied by two types of evidence-the ex-client's own testimony, and/or admissions of the defendant himself. Although a former
client may be reluctant to admit that he settled the case at a lower
figure to eliminate attorney's fees, his testimony can be quite damaging
to the defendant who has persuaded him to terminate the attorneyclient relationship. Such testimony may show misrepresentation concerning the attorney's rights or assurances that the interferor would
take care of the matter; 0 0 it might also take the form of an admission
by the alleged client that defendant's agent wrote the letter which
claimed that the plaintiff-attorney had never represented him;' 0 ' but
most damaging to the defendant, the ex-client's testimony may reek of
the defendant's coercive tactics in "persuading" him to discharge his
attorney. 10 2 When the ex-client testifies, "I know I was getting shed of
my lawyer on account of the pressure that was on me,"1 3 very little
remains to prevent verdict and judgment for plaintiffs. Evidence of
coercion, being a wrong to both client and attorney, has a tendency to
10 4
raise the ire of the bench.
Finally, there are instances where the defendant's own assertions,
whether ill-advised, careless, or overconfident, have been put to good
use against him. In one case, the interferors (tax advisors for an estate) boasted of their power to terminate the attorney's contract, and
they openly admitted giving a "line of hot air" to the attorney05
plaintiff.
As a practical matter, then, the aggrieved party should be alert to
indiscriminate and overconfident assertions by an intermeddler, as
well as careful to maintain friendly relations with his ex-client, whose
testimony can be invaluable.
VII. DAmAES
With regard to damages, there is another liberalizing trend. Formerly, the measure of damages against interfering third parties was
limited to the recovery of the fair value of actual services or to
100 Klauder v. Cregar, 327 Pa. 1, 192 Atl. 667, 669 (1937).
101
Studdard v. Evans, 108 Ga. App. 819, 135 S.E.2d 60, 63 (1964).
0
1 2 Richette v. Solomon, 410 Pa. 6, 187 A.2d 910, 914 (1963).
103 Ibid.
104 See Greenberg

v. Panama Transp. Co., 185 F. Supp. 320 (D.Mass. 1960);
Lurie v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 270 N.Y. 879, 1 N.E.2d 472 (1936); Richette v.
Solomon, 410 Pa. 6, 187 A.2d 910 (1963).
1o5 Calbom v. Knudtzon, 396 P.2d 148, 152 (Wash. 1964).
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following state law vis-a-vis the attorney's rights against the client
himself.'" 0
More recently, some courts have discarded many of the old compunctions against loose estimates of the plaintiff's damages, sometimes frankly making an educated guess as to what a fair measure
would be. 0 7 Others have harked to a relativistic tort formula, such
as "damages for the wrong should embrace all elements reasonably
flowing therefrom and not be limited by the amount of the settlement
made in its perpetration."' As an added precaution, attorney-plaintiffs
should make it clear that traditional lien-measures of damages are not
necessarily valued in the same manner as tort damages.

Furthermore, there has been a decided tendency for plantiff-attorneys to seek and, in appropriate cases, to receive punitive dam-

ages. 1 9 Clearly, the more unconscionable a defendant's behavior, the
greater the likelihood he will be assessed punitive damages. As was
noted in one leading case,
the jury was justified in imposing punitive damages on the defendants
to the end that they, as well as all other persons and entities, should become aware that it is contrary to law and fair dealings in the United
States, to sledgehammer a wedge between a lawyer and his client when
both are satisfied with each other and have not invited intermeddling and
officious intervention.Llo
VIII. KENTucKY ON Tm LAWYER'S CAUSE OF ACION IN TORT FOR
INTERFERENCE

Fortunately, Kentucky is one of the states whose lien laws cover
a portion of the territory connected with a lawyer's tort action against
third parties. Examination of the applicable statute and the cases
arising thereunder shows that the attorney has a lien on claims "put
into his hands," upon judgments, and even upon settlements if the
defendant in the primary case had notice of the attorney-client
106 Lurie v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 270 N.Y. 379, 380, 1 N.E.2d 472, 473
(1936).
107 Greenberg v. Panama Transp. Co., 185 F. Supp. 320, 323 (D. Mass. 1960).
108 State Farm Fire Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 184 F.2d 447, 448 (4th Cir. 1950).
The argument that damages should be measured according to the rules of contract
law was dealt with by another case. The court there pointed out that an intentional tort was involved, as were professional services replete with intangible
factors; that the damage claimed was the value of "professional business expectancy," prima facie proof of which is their reasonable value; and that
evidence of the amount and value of actual time and effort is readily available.
Calbom v. Knudtzon, 396 P.2d 148, 154 (Wash. 1964).
109 Herron v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 14 Cal. Rep. 296, 363 P.2d 310,
312 (1961); Rlichette v. Solomon, 410 Pa. 6, 187 A.2d 910, 915 (1963).
11o Richette v. Solomon, supra note 109, 187 A.2d at 914-15. The court
firther remarked: "[The defendant's behavior might] well be interpreted as
reflecting malice, vindictiveness and wanton disregard of the lawyer's . . .
rights which would call for punitive damages."
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relationship."" With this type of protection, recourse to tort actions
is less likely to arise; in fact, there are no reported cases of a lawyer
bringing an action for interference with his professional relationship
inthis state.
An early case, under the old lien provisions, identical in pertinent
portion to the present statute, emphasized that the plaintiff and
defendant could not settle and compromise with one eye on saving
the attorney's fee by cutting him entirely out of the picture. Settlement
must be in good faith." 2 Therefore, a tort theory would be of value
principally in situations where the lien itself failed or proved otherwise inadequate." 13
In view of the lack of decided cases on the attorney's cause of
action in particular, what is the status generally of the tort of
malicious interference with contract or economic relations in Kentucky?
Kentucky still seems to adhere to the minority view that the interference itself must be unlawful or fraudulent in nature to be
actionable. 114 But there are only two cases which have dwelt at any
length upon the topic. In 1930, Brooks v. Patterson"5 held that no
action in tort lay against an intermeddler who induced a breach of
contract, absent fraud or coercion and resultant damage. That case
dealt with an intermeddling landlord who took it upon himself to
advertise for sale a tenant's drug store. The price he was offering
turned out to be less than what the tenants could have obtained from
a prospective buyer who read the advertisement and withdrew from
the negotiations. In reaching its decision, the Court discussed an
earlier case which had stressed the element of causation as necessary
to an interference-with-contract action."" Damage must be directly
caused by the interference of the defendant-intruder, the Court indicated, and in Brooks v. Patterson, the loss of the would-be buyer
M'KRS § 80.200 (1942) reads as follows:
Each attorney shall have a lien upon all claims, except those of the
state, put into his hands for suit or collection or upon which suit has been
instituted, for the amount of any fee agreed upon by the parties or,
in the absence of such agreement, for a reasonable fee. If the action
is prosecuted to a recovery of money or property, the attorney shall
have a lien upon the judgment recovered, legal costs excepted, for
his fee. If the records show the name of the attorney, the defendant
shall be deemed to have notice of the lien. If the parties, before judgment, in good faith compromise or settle their differences without the
payment of money or other things of value, the attorney for the plaintiff
shall have no claim against the defendant for any part of his fee.
112 Hubble v. Dunlap. 101 Ky. 419, 41 S.W. 482 (189T) see also Jellico
Coal Mining Co. v. Pope, 292 Ky. 171, 166 S.W.2d 287 (1942); Proctor Coal
Co. v. Tye & Denham, 123 Ky. 381, 96 S.W. 512 (1906).
113 See text at note 3 supra.
114 See text at note 77 supra.

115 234 Ky. 757, 29 S.W.2d 26 (1930).
110 See text at note 93 supra.
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was occasioned by the buyer's own voluntary withdrawal from the
117
deal, not by any active inducement by the intermeddling landlord.
Dicta in a later case comports strangely, if at all, with these two
cases.
As strangers to the contract, the utility companies could be held liable
only for having wrongfully procured or induced the Department of Highways not to perform the contract. Such liability is predicated upon an

intentional interference, malicious or without justification, with known

contractual rights possessed by the party suing to recover damages there
for."l 8 (Emphasis added.)

Also interesting is the declaration of policies incorporated into the
Frazee v. Citizens Fid. Bank and Trust Co. opinion, one of which concerns the trust companies' promise to respect the choice of lawyer
made by its customers and do nothing to interfere. 119 Apparently, in
view of decisions in other jurisdictions and the Restatement of Torts,
which was written after Brooks v. Patterson,Kentucky might be persuaded to pursue the more moderate path already pointed out by
this later dicta. Furthermore, the Brooks v. Patterson decision is of itself no insuperable barrier to an attorney's action for inducing breach
of contract against a third party, for that case is distinguishable on
its own terms: "We are not here concerned with the subject where
the personal element or the relation of employer and employee is involved .... "120 The case does not necessarily apply to contracts of
personal relationship, such as attorney-client.
In conclusion, no insurmountable barriers would seeem to exist
to an attorney's tort action for interference with contract in Kentucky.
Certainly under proper facts of coercion or indefensible behavior by
the intermedler, a tort action, with the possibility of punitive damages,
would lie for intereference with economic interests. And because of
the personal, employment nature of the attorney-client contract, it
might well be that the means of interference themselves need not be
coercive or fraudulent. Where the lien statute proves inadequate, the
lack of case law in this Commonwealth should not be a deterrent. As
pointed out before, courts tend to follow a "rule of reason," rather
than rules of law, in affording redress where a man's property rights
in his source of livelihood, his legal practice, are disrupted.' 21
Eugene Mullins
117 234 Ky. 757, 758, 29 S.W.2d 26, 28 (1930).
118 Derby Road Bldg. Co. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways, 317 S.W.2d

891, 895 (Ky. 1958).
19 393 S.W.2d 778, 784 (Ky. 1964).
120 284 Ky. 757, 761, 29 S.W.2d 26, 28 (1930).
121 See text at note 78 supra.

